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JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS
Ronald Dworkin
Harvard University Press, 2011
REVIEWED BY ROBERT E. RODES, JR.

Professor Dworkin begins this complex and ambitious book with a
chapter called "Baedeker" after the nineteenth century guidebooks. In it, he
gives an overview of his project, which is to show "the unity of value." The
"title refers to a line by an ancient Greek poet, Archilochus, that Isaiah
Berlin made famous for us. The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog
knows one big thing. Value is one big thing" (1).
He articulates his overarching value in terms of human dignity: "[W]e
each have a sovereign ethical responsibility to make something of value of
our own lives, as a painter makes something valuable of his canvas" (13).
He distinguishes between ethics and morality "in what might seem a special
way. Moral standards prescribe how we ought to treat others; ethical
standards, how we ought to live ourselves" (191). He derives morality from
ethics, relying "mainly on Immanuel Kant's thesis that we cannot
adequately respect our own humanity unless we respect humanity in others"
(14). With this unitary value of human dignity in hand, Dworkin makes his
way through a philosophical obstacle course with the quiet authority of a
lifetime's reflection. He states objections fairly and answers them
respectfully. While, as I shall try to show, there are more objections than he
has taken up, and while many of his conclusions are open to disagreement,
he gives his readers an interesting journey in good company.
He answers all kinds of skepticism by arguing that a skeptical position
regarding, say, morality is just another position regarding morality, and just
as doubtful as any other such position. Thus, he says:
Hume's principle [that moral conclusions cannot be derived from
empirical premises] is often taken to have a stark skeptical consequence,
because it suggests that we cannot discover, through the only modes of
knowledge available to us, whether any of our ethical or moral convictions
is true. In fact, I argue ... his principle has the opposite consequence. It
undermines philosophical skepticism because the proposition that it is not
true that genocide is wrong is itself a moral proposition, and, if Hume's
principle is sound, that proposition cannot be established by any
discoveries of logic or facts about the basic structure of the universe. (17)
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He insists that moral and ethical questions have right answers, even if the
answers are sometimes difficult to find. He cautions (91-96) against
confusing uncertainty, the difficulty of finding right answers, with
indeterminacy, the lack of any right answers to be found. He argues that
uncertainty, not indeterminacy is the default position, that indeterminacy,
like any other view of a question, cannot be accepted unless a positive case
is made for it.
He deals with debate and difference of opinion by deploying an elaborate
account of interpretation, and concluding that moral judgments are based on
interpretations of moral concepts. For instance, to differ about whether the
income tax is unjust is to interpret the concept of justice in different ways
(166).
With this structure of value, Dworkin solves a number of well-known
moral hypotheticals (271-299). If you see a person drowning, you must
throw him a life preserver because you would not be respecting his dignity
if you did not. If you see two people drowning, you may throw the life
preserver to either without disrespecting the dignity of the other. If you are
one of several people drowning, you can keep the life preserver for yourself
if you get to it first, but you may not shoot someone to keep him from
getting to it ahead of you, because by shooting people you fail to respect
their dignity. Dworkin's analyses of these cases are, I believe, sound and
helpful. He follows them with good analyses of the obligations arising from
promises, relationships, or membership in a community.
When he comes to law and politics, Dworkin uses the standard liberal
principles of equality, liberty, and democracy. But he uses them as
interpretive-as opposed to "criterial"--concepts, because we have no
agreed-on criteria for applying them to particular cases:
There is nothing to be said for the definitions of equality, liberty, and
democracy proposed by Mill, Rawls, and most political scientists. They do
not track the criteria everyone uses when he identifies egalitarian policies,
liberal societies, or democratic institutions. There are no such shared
criteria; if there were, we would not argue in the way we do. (349)
We do better when we accept that the familiar concepts of political virtue
are interpretive concepts. Then we understand why they are so prominent
in the politics of nations whose political cultures were dramatically
reformed in the Enlightenment. We understand why the defining
revolutions of those nations were explicitly dedicated to liberty, equality,
and democracy and yet settled very little as to what these actually mean.
We also understand how we should proceed to develop our own
conceptions of these values: our own convictions about the concrete
political rights they name. (349)
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The conception Dworkin comes up with is, naturally enough, based on
the principles of dignity that he has been developing throughout the book.
He bases equality on the requirement of equal concern for all people making
something valuable of their lives. His attempt to show how that requirement
can be met in the actual distribution of resources seems to me too
hypothetical to be of much use; he refers us to other works in which he has
developed the subject at greater length. He finds that the same requirement
of equal concern calls for what he calls a partnership conception of
democracy as opposed to a majoritarian conception. The partnership
conception "holds that self-government means government not by the
majority of people exercising authority over everyone but by the people as a
whole acting as partners" (384). He believes that equal concern requires
giving everyone the vote, but he is willing to consider adjustments of
representation and judicial review to implement the partnership conception.
His idea of liberty is based on "ethical independence," which is for him
essential to the authenticity that dignity requires. "Authenticity is the other
side of self-respect. Because you take yourself seriously, you judge that
living well means expressing yourself in your life, seeking a way to live that
grips you as right for you and your circumstances" (209). "Authenticity is
damaged when a person is made to accept someone else's judgment in place
of his own about the values or goals his life should display" (212).
Therefore, "Government must not restrict freedom when its justification
assumes the superiority or popularity of any ethical values controversial in
the community" (369).
I am not sure Dworkin would go as far as Mill in forbidding government
interference with self-regarding conduct. For instance, he would allow seat
belt legislation because "seat belt convictions are not foundational, and
government need not assume that courting danger is a bad way to live in
order to justify measures that reduce the costs of accidents to the
community."' In general, then, he is more concerned with whole lives and
less with individual acts than Mill is. But his conclusions are pretty much
the same: he is not willing to protect individuals against self-destructive
choices, and he is not willing to protect the social ambience for the majority
(370).
Here I part company with him. I do not think that allowing people to
accept substandard living or working conditions, to trivialize their sexuality,
or to blow their minds away on drugs is consistent with the dignity that
1. I do not think Mill would regard "the costs of accidents to the community" as
sufficient to make the non-wearing of seat belts other-regarding. See On Liberty, 2d ed.
(London: J.W. Parker, 1859), 143-47.

218

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE

Vol. 56

Dworkin makes central to his value system. In my Jurisprudence course, I
use the case of Commonwealth v. Farrell,decided by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in 1948.2 I use it for a critique of Mill, but I think it
will do for Dworkin as well. It involved a particularly brutal
sadomasochistic encounter causing a man to be tried for assault and battery
upon a woman by means of a razor blade and a lighted cigarette. The
defense asked for a jury instruction that consent on the woman's part would
require acquittal. The trial court refused to give the instruction, and was
upheld in doing so. 3 The requested instruction is strongly counterintuitive,
but I do not see how either Dworkin or Mill could have avoided it.
But Dworkin is firm in rejecting intuitive moral discernment. He insists
that what we think are intuitive judgments are in fact arrived at by applying
general principles:
We often realize that an act is wrong immediately we spot it. When I see
someone beating a child, I "see" the wrongness of his act at once.
However, that is not an instance of moral facts causing moral conviction. I
would not have "seen" the wrongness of beating the child had I not already
formed the conviction that causing gratuitous pain is wrong. (72)
Dworkin rejects what he calls the causal impact hypothesis-the view "that
moral facts can cause people to form moral convictions that match those
moral facts"-the view, in other words, that when we think something is
wrong it may be because it actually is wrong (70-75). His reasoning here is
hard to follow. I think he is saying that saying I think X is wrong because it
is wrong is tantamount to attempting to prove the moral conclusion that X is
wrong from the empirical premise that I think it is wrong. Thus it violates
Hume's principle that moral conclusions cannot be derived from empirical
premises. But Dworkin's appeal to Hume here is misplaced, for Hume,
although he will not derive moral conclusions from empirical premises, is
quite ready to make moral conclusions an object of immediate-I would
like to say empirical--discernment:
The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions
amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them
the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders
morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice
our misery: it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some

2. 78 N.E.2d 697.
3. Ibid., 705. See also 706, rejecting expert testimony calculated to show that the victim
was a masochist.
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internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole
species.4

I would say, along with Jacques Maritain, 5 Edmond Cahn,6 and, I believe,
Hume, that the conviction that causing gratuitous pain is wrong comes from
a synthesis of immediate judgments that I arrived at when I saw people
beating children, kicking dogs, and knocking over old ladies.7
Dworkin's doctrine of ethical independence raises further problems when
we consider social justice. It was forty some-odd years ago that I first
encountered Dworkin's views in that regard. I fell into a conversation in an
Oxford common room with a fellow American who turned out to be
Dworkin. The subject was a project discussed in the United States at the
time for bringing Mexicans into the country temporarily for agricultural
labor. I took the position that we should not bring people into our country to
live and work under conditions that were, by our standards, degrading. He
insisted, as he does in the book, that we must never deal with a person for
his own good except as he himself wishes to be dealt with. I was thoroughly
worsted in the argument, but I still think I was right. Human dignity can,
and often does, require us to interfere with arrangements people make to
their own satisfaction. To deny that is to take the side of Justice Peckham in
Lochner v. New York:
[W]hen the State... has passed an act which seriously limits the right to
labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between
persons who are sui juris (both employer and employd), it becomes of
great importance to determine which shall prevail-the right of the
individual to labor for such time as he may choose, or the right of the State
to prevent the individual from working [beyond] a certain time prescribed
by the State.8
Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which
grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living are mere
meddlesome interferences with the right of the individual ....

4. David Hume, An Enquery Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L.
Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998; orig. pub. 1777), 5.
5. Jacques Maritain, "On Knowledge Through Connaturality," in The Range of Reason
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 22.
6. Edmond N. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice: An Anthropocentric View of Law (New
York: New York University Press, 1949).
7. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., "On Lawyers and Moral Discernment," Journal of Catholic
Legal Studies 46 (2007): 59.
8. 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905).
9. Ibid., 61.
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Perhaps I am wrong to attribute this view to Dworkin, for our conversation
was a long time ago, and the book says nothing about social justice issues
one way or the other. But social justice is not to be achieved without
limiting people's choices for their own good, and Dworkin insists that that
is not to be done.
Dworkin's absolutizing of ethical independence may be attributable in
some part to his attitude toward religion. He treats it as cosmically
irrelevant. "A god's existence and achievements, if any god does exist, are
matters of fact, albeit rather special and exotic facts. Any god's moral
authority, if this exists, is a matter of value" (343). And Hume has taught us
that we cannot derive matters of value from matters of fact. Accordingly,
"no divine authority can provide a ground for basic human rights. On the
contrary, the logic of argument runs the other way: we must assume the
independent and logically prior existence of human rights in order to accept
the idea of divine moral authority" (340). Having thus disposed of God,
Dworkin is left without a teleological support for human dignity. He
therefore contents himself with an ipse dixit:
We are charged to live well by the bare fact of our existence as selfconscious creatures with lives to lead. We are charged in the way we are
charged by the value of anything entrusted to our care. It is important that
we live well; not important just to us or to anyone else, but just important.
(196)
From the necessity that we live well, he derives from Kant, as we have seen,
the necessity that we care about other people living well.
This intuition deserves the fullest respect, but it is insufficient. We are
indeed charged to live well, and it is indeed important for us to do so. But
the charge does not hang in the air, it comes from God, and the way to fulfil
it is to deploy our resources creatively in love of God and neighbor. When
we are hindered in doing that, whether by our own act, or by the acts of
others, or by the economic and social institutions under which we live, our
dignity is undermined and injustice is done us. We are constantly tempted to
accept injustices of this kind, or to inflict them on ourselves-to trade off
dignity for cash or some other ephemeral object. If the law can encourage us
to resist such temptations, it should do so. Ethical independence is
important, but in cases like Commonwealth v. Farrell or Lochner v. New
York it can be subordinated to the dignity it is meant to serve.
Dworkin ends his book with a short chapter on law. He points out that he
has presented his views on the subject at length in other works, and says:
"My aim in this chapter is not to summarize my jurisprudential views in any
detail but rather to show how they take their place within the integrated
scheme of value this book attempts" (400). He treats the concept of law as
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interpretive rather than criterial, and, evidently for that reason, rejects the
conventional treatment of law and morality as two separate systems (402-3).
The problem with having two systems, as he sees it, is that the question of
the relation between them cannot be assigned to either. I find this argument
unconvincing. I am quite content to say that the question of what part moral
considerations play in legal decision making is a legal question, while the
question of what moral obligations are created by legal dispositions is a
moral question. Separating the two questions does not seem to me to
prevent accepting Dworkin's view of the unity of values. There is also a
question of what part morality plays in decision making by plumbers
(whether lead pipe is so toxic that it would be immoral to use it), and a
question of what moral obligations are created by plumbing work (whether
there is so little hot water that it would be a wrong to other people in my
building if I were to spend fifteen minutes in the shower). But these
questions do not make a single system of morality and plumbing. While law
is more impacted by values than plumbing is, it has, like plumbing, a strong
technical (and criterial) element that defines it for most of its practitioners.
Justice for Hedgehogs has, in my opinion, achieved its purpose of
defending the unity of value. In the process, it has succeeded in placing
human dignity at the center of the legal enterprise where it belongs. It has
also neatly disposed of moral skepticism and moral relativism. It has offered
persuasive answers to many questions of moral and legal obligation. With
its distinction between interpretive and criterial concepts, it has provided a
useful insight into the structure of legal analysis and the source of legal
disagreement. It is, then, in many ways a valuable book. But I wish
Dworkin had been able to carry his understanding of human dignity beyond
the wistful existentialism of his conclusion: "Without dignity our lives are
only blinks of duration. But if we manage to lead a good life well, we create
something more. We write a subscript to our mortality. We make our lives
tiny diamonds in the cosmic sands" (423). All very true, but it is not
enough.

